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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION III
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SUBJECT: Drake Superfund Site--Estimation of Emission Rates During "Routine" Automatic Soil Feed Shutoffs **DATE:** 7/16/96

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One of the comments apparently raised in regard to EPA's risk assessment of the Drake site incinerator concerns operations during "off-normal" conditions that are not covered by the process upset evaluation. It is not clear whether this is intended to refer to "routine" operations that result in higher-than-average emissions or whether it refers to automatic soil feed shutoff events which fall short of the thermal relief valve (TRV) openings that were modeled as the worst case process upsets.

The response to the first scenario is very straightforward. Emission estimates used in the revised risk assessment are not "average" emission estimates, but rather "worst case" estimates for the operating range allowed under the PADEP Air Quality Equivalency Document.

The purpose of this memorandum is to explain my rationale for concluding that modeled emission rates should not be affected by automatic soil feed cutoff events that do not include a TRV opening.

The conditions that would trigger this type of automatic soil feed shutoff (ASFS) are listed beginning on page 3B-1 of the Risk Assessment. Some of the parameters (e.g., dry ash conveyor operation, kiln rotation speed) should not have any measurable effect on incinerator performance (i.e., destruction and removal of pollutant compounds). Since soil feed would be shut off, with no decrease in performance, emissions would decline rapidly following an ASFS triggered by one of these parameters.

Failure to operate within most of the listed parameters (e.g., kiln pressure, afterburner temperature, stack flow rate, etc.) could have a marginally detrimental effect on performance.

However, the reduced performance would be more than offset by the elimination of additional feed compounds. This would again result in decreased emission rates.

Failure of both secondary combustion chamber burners is the only listed event that is predicted to have a significant effect on system performance. This would affect only nondioxin organic emissions. (The predicted effect, if any, on dioxin compounds would be to reduce their formation in the air pollution control equipment (APCE) by reducing the APCE temperature.) It is estimated that secondary burner failure would result in a 99.9% organic destruction and removal efficiency (DRE), creating a ten-fold increase over normal emissions.

The attached Table shows the predicted emission profile for the secondary burner failure scenario. It is characterized by an initial ten-fold increase over normal emissions, followed by an exponential decline to 1% of the original value after 25 minutes. This includes the combined effects of reduced DRE (99.9% over the entire period) and the soil feed shutoff. This incorporates the assumption, used in Section 2.4 of the Risk Assessment, that the vaporization of hazardous constituents declines to 1% of the original value 25 minutes after the soil feed shutoff.

Clearly, the short term effect of this event is less significant than the TRV opening that is modeled in the Risk Assessment. During the modeled TRV opening, DRE is predicted to drop to 99%, producing a 100-fold increase in most organic emissions. Metals and other inorganic emissions are also predicted to increase significantly. Therefore, the modeled TRV opening is a worst case estimate of acute exposures.

As shown in the attached Table, the long term effect of reduced DRE is predicted to be almost exactly offset by terminating the soil feed. The hourly average emission rate following the ASFS is predicted to be approximately the same as the rate for routine operations.

Based on this evaluation, ASFS's that do not include a TRV opening are predicted to have a negligible effect on hourly emission rates. It follows that they would not affect the long term risk estimates. Furthermore, the TRV opening that is modeled in the revised risk assessment represents a more severe acute exposure scenario. Hence, the TRV opening is the controlling acute exposure scenario.

Attachment

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
DRAKE SUPERFUND SITE
EMISSIONS FOLLOWING ASFS vs. NORMAL EMISSIONS

| TIME | NORMAL OPERATION | | OPERATION WITH ASFS | |
|---------|------------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|
| | VOL. RATE | EMISSION RATE | VOL. RATE | EMISSION RATE |
| 0 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1000 | 1.0000 |
| 1 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 832 | 0.8318 |
| 2 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 692 | 0.6918 |
| 3 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 575 | 0.5755 |
| 4 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 479 | 0.4786 |
| 5 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 398 | 0.3981 |
| 6 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 331 | 0.3311 |
| 7 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 275 | 0.2754 |
| 8 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 229 | 0.2291 |
| 9 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 191 | 0.1906 |
| 10 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 159 | 0.1585 |
| 11 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 132 | 0.1318 |
| 12 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 110 | 0.1097 |
| 13 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 91 | 0.0912 |
| 14 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 76 | 0.0759 |
| 15 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 63 | 0.0631 |
| 16 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 52 | 0.0525 |
| 17 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 44 | 0.0437 |
| 18 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 36 | 0.0363 |
| 19 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 30 | 0.0302 |
| 20 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 25 | 0.0251 |
| 21 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 21 | 0.0209 |
| 22 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 17 | 0.0174 |
| 23 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 14 | 0.0145 |
| 24 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 12 | 0.0120 |
| 25 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 10 | 0.0100 |
| 26 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 8 | 0.0083 |
| 27 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 7 | 0.0069 |
| 28 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 6 | 0.0058 |
| 29 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 5 | 0.0048 |
| 30 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 4 | 0.0040 |
| 31 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 3 | 0.0033 |
| 32 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 3 | 0.0028 |
| 33 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 2 | 0.0023 |
| 34 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 2 | 0.0019 |
| 35 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 2 | 0.0016 |
| 36 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0013 |
| 37 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0011 |
| 38 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0009 |
| 39 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0008 |
| 40 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0006 |
| 41 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 1 | 0.0005 |
| 42 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0004 |
| 43 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0004 |
| 44 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0003 |
| 45 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0003 |
| 46 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0002 |
| 47 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0002 |
| 48 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 49 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 50 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 51 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 52 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 53 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0001 |
| 54 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 55 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 56 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 57 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 58 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 59 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| 60 | 1000 | 0.1000 | 0 | 0.0000 |
| AVERAGE | | 0.1000 | | 0.0974 |

For illustrative purposes only, the normal feed (i.e., volatilization) rate of organic constituents is assumed to be 1000 lb/hr. The emission rate during normal operations is calculated by applying a 99.99% DRE to the assumed feed rate (i.e., multiply the "Vol. Rate" by 0.0001).

Following failure of the secondary chamber burners, the automatic soil feed shutoff (ASFS) activates immediately. The organic volatilization rate is assumed to immediately begin to decline at an exponential rate, reaching 1% of the original rate after 25 minutes. The incinerator DRE is also assumed to decrease 10-fold to 99.9%. Thus, the emission rate is calculated by multiplying the volatilization rate by 0.001.

As shown at the bottom of the Table, the hourly average emission rates under both scenarios are, essentially, equal. Both scenarios are plotted graphically below.



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